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 1.  Introduction 
  European integration (the transfer of policymaking authority from national governments 
to Brussels) presents a dilemma for national immigration authorities.  The walls and borders that 
divided East and West have slowly crumbled and the lines between insiders and outsiders are 
increasingly blurred.  The EU has expanded from 15 member countries to 25, which will 
eventually allow almost 500 million citizens to move freely across borders.  With little or no 
coordination on security and immigration issues, Europe will experience an unprecedented 
challenge.  Can nation-states construct free trade zones – allowing free movement of persons, 
services and goods – without common immigration policies?  Or is a common immigration 
policy the inevitable product of the functioning of regional economic cooperation, despite the 
national pressure to maintain domestic control over this sensitive issue? 
  Looking at the history of European integration, one sees that in other policy areas (such 
as gender equality or environmental protection), member state governments did not originally 
anticipate the degree to which the EU’s central institutions (the European Commission, Court of 
Justice, and Parliament) would eventually gain policymaking authority as the EU evolved (Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1998, Stone Sweet, Fligstein and Sandholtz 2001, Stone Sweet 2000, Stone 
Sweet and Caporaso 1998, Cichowski 1998).  Thus, when the real possibily of EU-level 
immigration policy “harmonization” arose in the run-up to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 
member states tread very carefully.  The EU’s involvement with immigration in the Maastricht 
Treaty was kept to a minimum, weak, “intergovernmental” bargain, whereby any one member 
state could veto any proposed EU immigration policy, and such policies (if passed) would only 
be non-binding targets, as opposed to “hard”, judicially enforceable laws.  This development 
makes sense, of course, given immigration’s high degree of political salience, and given the worries of national governments that electorates would punish them for relinquishing control 
over entry into national territory (a central facet of the Westphalian state). 
  And yet events in the last decade have proven surprising.  Despite open member state 
worries over the possibility of the EU taking control over immigration policy, and despite 
conscious national attempts to head off EU control through institutional innovations and 
blockages, the draft European constitution makes immigration an area of full EU control.
1  In the 
meantime, the EU has also passed binding immigration laws in a variety of areas, which now 
commit national governments to implementing EU immigration policy.  What factors caused this 
dramatic result, and what does this mean for the future rights and freedoms of the EU’s 
immigrants? 
  Section Two of this paper will detail the evolution of the EU’s immigration regime, from 
Maastricht’s modest beginnings, to the ambitious European constitution.  Since “immigration 
policy” is a very broad topic, covering diverse areas such as labor migration, family 
reunification, political asylum, social integration, and the fight against illegal immigration, the 
third and fourth sections will focus on one key policy area: the rights and freedoms of Europe’s 
nearly 20 million “third-country nationals” (TCNs), who are legally resident in an EU member 
state, but do not hold citizenship in any member state.  Despite calls by the European 
Commission, the Parliament, and several of the member states, TCNs do not possess the same 
rights as EU citizens to move freely and take up employment in any member state.  Therefore 
these immigrants, though legally resident in the EU, cannot participate in the common market.  
The third and fourth sections will detail the political struggle over whether or not to give free 
movement rights to TCNs, looking at the key roles played by the European Court of Justice 
                                                 
1 Though with one significant exception – Germany succeeded in inserting a clause into the draft constitution stating 
that member states shall retain responsibility for setting levels (numbers) of immigrants who can enter their country. (analyzed in Section Three) and the European Commission (analyzed in Section Four) in the face 
of strong opposition by powerful member states.  This political struggle will be analyzed in the 
context of the debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998, Moravcsik 1998), and will be analyzed on the basis of secondary sources, and 
interviews I conducted with political actors in Brussels during 2003 and 2004.  The fifth section 
concludes the chapter, analyzing the extent of TCN free movement rights as they currently stand, 
as well as their prospects of future expansion, in the broader perspective of the increasing degree 
of EU control over immigration policy in the 21
st Century. 
 
2.  The Evolution of a European Union Immigration Regime 
  Europe’s national governments are under constant political pressure on the issue of 
immigration.  One the one side, business groups call for more immigration, and human rights 
groups call for a higher level of immigrant rights and freedoms.  On the other side, however, 
electorates punish political parties deemed “soft” on immigration, and many voters turn towards 
radical Right parties, who openly advocate strong anti-immigration stances.  In some countries, 
of course, radical Right parties have even won governing power, while in other countries, radical 
Right parties simply push mainstream parties into taking more restrictive stances on immigration 
(Schain, Zolberg and Hossay 2002, Givens 2002, Sniderman et al. 2000). 
  In such a highly-charged political situation, where national governments are often 
accused of “losing control” over immigration, one might not expect to see national governments 
willingly giving up what control they do have to the European Union.  This is especially so given 
that the European Commission (the EU’s quasi-executive branch) and Parliament have openly 
expressed pro-immigrant opinions, and have called for a more pro-active and egalitarian immigration policy, which respects human rights and serves the needs of business (European 
Commission 2000, European Parliament 2001).  And yet this section will detail how the logic of 
European integration seemingly pushes towards EU control over immigration.  Member states 
have apparently found it impossible to have a free-travel zone (with a common external border), 
without also agreeing on a common policy of who to let in to this zone, and what rights and 
freedoms they should enjoy once they are in.  This is how immigration differs from other high-
salience policy areas, such as defense policy and foreign policy.  Immigration policy has a clear 
link with the common market and the free-travel zone.  To put it bluntly, Italy’s frontiers are now 
Sweden’s frontiers. 
  Of course, in the run-up to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Europe did not yet have a free-
travel zone, and the single market existed mainly on paper.  Yet even at this early stage, member 
states had already seen limited advantages to coordinating and cooperating on immigration 
policy, though keeping the final say for each national government, of course.  As early as 1976, a 
resolution by the EU’s Council of Ministers (the legislative body representing national 
governments) encouraged member states to develop common immigration policies, in 
consultation with the Commission (Papademetriou 1996).  Economic malaise and anti-immigrant 
politics throughout the 1970s seemed to prevent any further movement towards a common 
policy, but in the mid-1980s, as both economic growth and European integration gathered speed, 
the Commission put forth a set of “Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration” (European 
Commission 1985).  These guidelines not only emphasized the importance of free movement for 
EU citizens (which was by now a right well-established in EU law, though little-used by EU 
workers), but also called for “equality of treatment in living and working conditions for all 
migrants, whatever their origins” (cited in Papademetriou 1996, 20).  In other words, the Commission called for TCNs to be given free movement rights, commensurate with EU citizens.  
In the same year (1985), the Commission also released a Decision that required member states to 
provide advance notice of any measures they intended to take towards TCNs in the areas of 
entry, residence and employment.  However, even this small, non-binding step was unwelcome 
as far as some member states were concerned, and these member states took their objections to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), arguing that the Commission had over-stepped its authority 
by seeking to play a role in immigration policy.  The ECJ reached a compromise decision, 
voiding parts of the Decision, but letting the remainder stand (Papademetriou 1996).  This 
political struggle over immigration policymaking authority foreshadowed the much larger 
struggles that were to come a decade later. 
  In 1986, the beginnings of the single market became reality, with the Single European 
Act’s declaration of the “four freedoms”: freedom of movement for goods, services, capital, and 
(most importantly), persons.  Predictably, the Commission interpreted the category of “persons” 
expansively, arguing that it should cover legally-resident TCNs.  Member states, on the other 
hand, argued that it should cover EU citizens only.  Worried about the Commission’s expansive 
position, member states adopted a declaration affirming their right to control immigration policy 
(Papademetriou 1996).   
  The following years saw member states coooperating only minimally on immigration, 
using intergovernmental fora that were entirely outside of the EU’s institutional structure, and 
did not bind national governments to any “hard” commitments.  But the early 1990s brought new 
opportunity for EU control, during the intergovernmental conference leading up to the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Given that free movement for EU citizens would soon become a reality, the 
Commission, European Parliament, and some member states argued that the existing structure of immigration cooperation was both inefficient (a multitude of overlapping bodies producing no 
binding commitments) and undemocratic (meeting behind closed doors, with no parliamentary 
and judicial oversight).  These same actors called for immigration to be brought under EU 
jurisdiction, to make it more open, democratic and effective (Hix 1995). 
  Heeding member state reluctance, however, the Luxembourg Presidency of the EU in 
1991 proposed an institutional structure that would keep foreign/defense policy and immigration 
as separate “pillars” of the Community, outside of the control of the Commission, Parliament and 
Court of Justice.  This draft was met with resistance by several of the more pro-EU member 
states, one of which, the Netherlands, submitted an alternate draft Treaty that brought 
immigration policy under EU control.  But this draft was defeated by the more skeptical member 
states, including the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece and France.  The resulting Maastricht Treaty 
thus prevented immigration policy from becoming “supranationalized” in four respects: 1) it 
allowed member states the right of initiative to propose new EU-level measures (in “normal” EU 
decision-making, it is only the Commission who can propose new measures); 2) it allowed the 
Parliament only the right to be “consulted” over decisions, but gave it no veto or amendment 
power; 3) it prevented the ECJ from having legal jurisdiction over immigration; and 4) it allowed 
any member state to veto a proposed measure.  Thus, the Maastricht Treaty was a victory for 
intergovernmentalism, in that it did little to change the already-existing structures for 
immigration cooperation (Papademetriou 1996). 
  Five years later, however, the debate was re-opened.  In the run-up to the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, three key developments pushed immigration cooperation back onto the 
agenda.  First, the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Schengen agreement (on free travel) into 
the EU’s institutional structure.  Thus, external borders would become common borders, obviously lending new salience to immigration cooperation.  Second, the modest cooperation 
already achieved on immigration (e.g. agreements over common standards on political asylum, 
to prevent “asylum-shopping” among member states), was seen by national governments as a 
success, in that it allowed them to crack down on immigration at the EU level, where they were 
relatively free of pressure by pro-immigrant NGOs and courts (Guiraudon 2000, Lahav and 
Guiraudon 2000, Givens and Luedtke 2004).  Increasing problems with illegal immigration and 
political asylum throughout the 1990s gave these issues even more pressing salience.  And 
finally, most participants agreed that the “Third Pillar” structure was relatively inefficient, given 
the plethora of intergovernmental groups that lacked the power to forge binding commitments 
(Geddes 2000). 
  These factors pushed all but the most reluctant member states (the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark) to re-think their opposition to EU control.  Thus, the Amsterdam Treaty achieved a 
partial supranationalization of immigration policy authority.  It was agreed that after five years, 
the Commission would gain the sole right of initiative, the Parliament would gain the power of 
“co-decision”, the unanimity requirement (national veto) in the Council would disappear, and 
decisions would thus be taken by a majority vote (though this arrangement would have to be 
implemented by a unanimous vote after the five-year transition period!).  It was also agreed to 
give the European Court of Justice jurisdiction over immigration, though with a special 
exception, in that only high courts could refer cases to the ECJ (this is detailed in Section Three).  
Since the three most skeptical member states (UK, Denmark, Ireland) were not participants in the 
Schengen agreement, they were allowed to “opt-out” of this new decision-making structure, thus 
allowing them to drop their objections to supranationalization (Geddes 2000).   As the five-year transition period neared its close, it was overshadowed by the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, and the resulting draft Constitution.  Secure in the 
knowledge that EU control had allowed them to be “tough” on immigration over the past five 
years, by passing highly restrictive measures (most notably the various steps to reduce the 
number of asylum-seekers, which even the UK had opted in to!), member states appeared swept 
up in the supranationalist momentum of the Constitution, and agreed to further expand EU 
control.  Not only would the Commission get the sole right of initiative, the Parliament get co-
decision, and the member states lose the national veto (as agreed at Amsterdam, after five years), 
but the ECJ was also given full jurisdiction over immigration (in that any national court could 
request an ECJ ruling).  The only full (opting-in) participant to express strong skepticism was 
Germany, who succeeded in inserting a compromise clause into the Constitution stating that 
member states shall retain the ultimate control over determining the quantitative levels of 
immigration in their countries. 
  It is by no means clear that the draft Constitution will pass, however, and in the 
meantime, the five-year transition period has ended.  Accordingly, member state governments 
agreed in late 2004 on a blueprint for EU immigration policy, the Hague Programme, which will 
lay the groundwork until the Constitution’s passage (and will continue to guide policymaking in 
the event of the Constitution’s failure).  And during interviews with political actors in Brussels, I 
learned that the Hague Programme is seen by many as a setback for supranationalism, in that it 
prevents the ECJ from having full jurisdiction over immigration (again, only national high courts 
can refer cases), and, more importantly, it moves all areas of immigration policymaking to co-
decision and majority voting, except for one key area: legal migration.  In other words, other 
areas of immigration policy (most notably illegal immigration and political asylum) will become “normal” EU policy areas, with full EU control, but control over legal migration will retain 
aspects of intergovernmentalism (unanimity voting in the Council, and no co-decision power for 
the European Parliament). 
  Thus, EU immigration policy faces two possible futures.  If the draft Constitution passes, 
then full EU control will become a reality (though with the caveat that member states can set 
numerical levels of immigrants).  But if the Hague Programme continues to be the guiding 
structure, then national governments will have retained control over the most sensitive area of 
immigration: legal migration.  Illegal immigration and political asylum, while sensitive in their 
own right, raise less controversy when delegated to Brussels, because they are seen in terms of 
restriction and control; i.e., how can the EU help reduce the numbers?  Legal migration is more 
sensitive for national governments because these are decisions over who to let in.  Member state 
governments have few problems with using the EU as a way to coordinate exclusion; 
coordinating inclusion is a different matter altogether. 
  What does the evolution of EU control over immigration policy mean for the rights and 
freedoms of Europe’s almost 20 million third-country nationals?  Will TCNs gain the right to 
participate in the EU’s single market, by moving freely across borders to take up employment?  
The next two sections analyze the political struggle over TCN free movement rights, beginning 
with the role of the European Court of Justice, and moving to the Commission in Section Four.  
Both sections will be analyzed in the context of the debate between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism.  For supranationalists, the EU tends to gain increasing power despite the 
intentions of member states (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998), while for intergovernmentalists, 
member states always retain the final say (Moravscik 1998).  Given that the European 
Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice have advocated the expansion of immigrant rights and freedoms, while national governments have preferred a restrictive line, the debate between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism is of direct importance to the future of Europe’s 
TCNs. 
 
3.  Third-Country Nationals and the European Court of Justice 
  Until recently, developments in EU immigration policy seem to have provided strong 
verification for intergovernmentalism, especially because the member states consciously 
excluded the ECJ (normally the vanguard of supranationalism) from jurisdiction over a key 
policy area.  This is the issue of legally-resident TCNs, who are workers that do not possess free 
movement rights in the EU, due to not having citizenship in their member state of residence.  
Many analysts were skeptical about TCNs ever gaining free movement rights, despite the fact 
that the European Parliament, Commission, and some of the more federally-minded member 
states consistently called for the granting of these rights throughout the 1990s (Papademetriou 
1996).  This is because the Parliament and the Commission both lacked the political clout to get 
such rights past the Council, who still voted by the unanimity rule where immigration is 
concerned.  Thus, it seemed that the ECJ was the only institution that could grant TCN rights, 
due to the special political status of European law on free movement of workers, and of a legacy 
of successful rights claims within this law.  However, the institutional changes after Amsterdam 
(detailed above) gave the Commission more clout in the area of immigration, resulting in the 
passage of a directive in 2004 that gives TCNs some limited form of free-movement rights.  This 
seemed to make the Court’s role less crucial, and to enhance the Commission’s ability to expand 
immigrant rights, though the ECJ may still play a vital role in interpreting the new rules.   Looking at TCN cases that have already come before the Court, as well as the views of 
other analysts regarding the likely role that the Court will play on immigration, I will now 
answer the question of whether there is anything “special” about immigration as a policy area 
that prevents the ECJ from gaining as much jurisdiction over it as it has over other policy areas.  
After covering the ECJ’s role, Section Four will analyze the European Commission’s power and 
the new “Long Term Residents Directive”, a piece of binding EU law passed in 2004, to 
determine its effect on TCN free movement rights.  These two sections will attempt to answer 
the question of whether TCN rights have been expanded (or the institutional groundwork laid for 
future expansion), against the express wishes of some of the member states.  Since the 
institutional arrangements for making immigration policy in Brussels are currently unclear, given 
the confusion surrounding the European Constitution, I will close by pointing to some initial 
signs that show promise for increased future oversight by the Court of Justice and the 
Commission. 
  Undeniably, the ECJ has gained some jurisdiction over the rights of TCN immigrants, 
through its power to legislate on free movement of workers.  Free movement policy (for EU 
nationals) is by now strongly “supranationalized,” with EU jurisdiction.  This is a fait accompli.  
However, all EU immigration policy vis-à-vis legal immigrants, which does not deal with the 
movement of EU nationals (those who are citizens of member states), is still decided upon in a 
quasi-intergovernmental fashion, meaning that the EU’s central organizations (the EP, 
Commission and ECJ) have little “competence” over this area.  However, in the words of Geddes 
(2000), “this does not mean that the two [free movement and immigration] are disconnected and 
can be analyzed separately” (32).  They are inextricably linked in the political realm, because, 
paradoxically, “freer movement for EU citizens has brought with it tighter controls on movement by non-EU citizens [TCNs]” (32).  At the same time, “free movement for people has . . . created 
legal and political sources of power and authority [like the ECJ] that have implications for 
TCNs” (43).  In other words, by giving the Court the power to regulate free movement, the 
member states unintentionally granted the Court a limited say over immigration policy as a 
whole, since immigration is inseperable from free movement in some limited ways, which will 
be detailed below.  If we can find evidence of the Court making use of this role, to eventually 
grant TCNs free movement rights against the wishes of national politicians, then we can say that 
“spillover” (a key causal mechanism of supranationalization, whereby the EU expands its power 
into new areas) has occurred. 
  Initially, the Court had no role to play, as free movement was advanced under the 
framework of the 1985 Schengen Agreement, an intergovernmental bargain by 6 member states, 
outside of the EU’s institutional framework, to drop all internal border controls.  Squabbling over 
standards held up implementation, however, and in 1987 the EU “caught up” to Schengen 
through the Single European Act, which formally proposed the “four freedoms” of movement.  
In 1992 the Single European Act’s ambitious goals came to concrete fruition in the Maastricht 
Treaty, with its “Third Pillar”, as detailed above.  Again, the Third Pillar was seen as widening 
the EU’s “democratic deficit” by handing more power to member state executives (ministries 
that deal with immigration), who were to have no judicial oversight.  In Article K2 of Maastricht, 
a symbolic nod was made to compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Geneva Convention, but this would prove “difficult to enforce because the provision was not 
justiciable by the ECJ” (Geddes 2000, 96).   This is an obvious point for intergovernmentalism.  
Geddes argues that the Third Pillar “indicated superficial regard for the symbolic importance of 
these international obligations, but scant regard for ensuring effective compliance” (96).   What was the Court’s role in all of this?  The Court in fact played the very role that its 
member state principals would have wanted, striking down the Commission’s only two 
regulations on immigration, both of which dealt with harmonized visa policy (Geddes, 100).  
Thus, at this point things looked quite bad for the supranationalist outlook, as EU institutions 
were locked out of the process and the Court made sure to reinforce this state of affairs. 
  The Amsterdam Treaty changed things only marginally vis-à-vis ECJ jurisdiction, with 
its compromise decision whereby the ECJ was only given jurisdiction when national courts of 
“final instance” requested rulings, an apparently rare prospect according to one legal analyst 
(Guild 1998).  And again, the 2004 Hague Programme retained this restriction.  What does this 
mean for eventual ECJ jurisdiction over TCN matters?  In other policy areas, the ECJ’s growing 
jurisdiction has depended on using the law itself as a shield and a mask, relying on the isolation 
of the legal realm’s “technical discourse” to overcome member state reluctance, which in turn 
depends upon the the consistency and coherency of legal reasoning and the EU’s evolving case 
law (Mattli and Slaughter 1998).  The mechanism of “direct effect,” which allows any national 
court to request an ECJ ruling, is the key component in this process (Weiler 1994).  Aware of 
this requirement, the member states (consistent with intergovernmentalism) appeased Britain and 
Denmark by denying full direct effect on TCN matters.  “Therefore coherence will be much 
slower dependent first on the adoption of measures which will regulate TCNs . . . and it will take 
much longer for interpretive questions to reach the Luxembourg Court” (Guild 1998, 619).  That 
is, if spillover is to happen, it may be a longer, more drawn-out process than with other areas of 
European law. 
  Further, Amsterdam explicitly denied the ECJ jurisdiction in all areas of border controls 
(including TCN entry) that “relate to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security” (Monar 1998, 141), which may well be interpreted to cover all areas of 
immigration policy in the current political climate.  This might seem like an additional victory 
for intergovernmentalism, but the ECJ actually has the power, under Amsterdam, to determine 
for itself the criteria for “law and order” and “internal security,” meaning that the Court will 
likely not rule itself out of the picture.  This, of course, seems more consistent with 
supranationalism. 
  The legal coherence and consistency problem, however, remains a daunting challenge for 
the supranationalist outlook.  Again, EU free movement law (for EU citizens only) is both 
coherent and consistent, with full EU supremacy.  “Coherence,” in this case, means no national 
discretion over legal matters, since national discretion is an inherent obstacle to integration.  
Thus, in line with supranationalist expectations, and against the political wishes of member 
states, the Court expanded the legal coherence and consistency of free movement law, setting a 
seemingly irreversible process into motion.  EU nationals now have free movement rights that 
are judicially enforceable at the supranational level.  Rights enforcement is a key mechanism for 
legal spillover, since it constitutes “implicit delegations of enormous discretionary authority to 
constitutional judges” (Stone Sweet 2000, 96).  But what about TCNs?  Under the Amsterdam 
Treaty, TCNs now have the coherent, consistent right to short-term travel across the EU’s 
internal borders without frontier checks.  However, there is a clear lack of rights, protections and 
freedoms in three other areas of TCN travel, which are still subject to full member state 
discretion (with no “floor” of standards/procedures that could pave the way for rights-claiming).  
These are:  visa-free travel, standards for the issuing of visas, and external border checks.  In 
these three areas, member states are free from the ECJ’s watchful eyes, and can apply the utmost 
national discretion in their policies.  TCNs who feel that they are unjustly required to have visas, are unjustly denied visas, or are abused at the EU’s external borders have no formal recourse to 
the ECJ (Guild, 617). 
  Intergovernmentalists would take heart at this state of affairs, since it maximizes the 
ability of national politicians to capitalize on the public’s fears over immigration as a national 
security threat.  But how did the supranational institutions attempt to counter this 
marginalization?  The European Parliament, keen to extend ECJ jurisdiction (as well as its own 
competence) challenged national discretion over visa policy in the Court of Justice itself, and lost 
(Parliament v Council [1997] cited in Guild, 617).  This seemingly confirms the hypothesis of 
Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz (1998), who argue that the Court is reluctant to overstep its 
delineated role on issues where it feels it could lose political legitimacy in the eyes of its member 
state creators.  Thus, TCNs remain only the “objects” of EU policy and law, and cannot be 
“actors” in their own legal right since they have no right of direct effect (bringing ECJ-justiciable 
claims to national courts).  Under intergovernmentalism, there is no legal framework, which in 
turn means no legal coherence or consistency, which in turn means that law cannot function as 
mask or shield to everyday politics.  Indeed, there is not even a clear, stated, guiding goal for 
TCN policy in the Treaty (unlike with free movement), so the Court has no guiding principles to 
invoke in future rulings.  In the absence of guiding principles and legal coherence, there would 
seem to be scant possibility for spillover.  Intergovernmentalism, again, seems to be confirmed 
by the member states retaining discretion in order to minimize domestic political costs. 
  However, it was mentioned earlier that there are some openings, or “political opportunity 
spaces,” that might allow for spillover by letting the ECJ rule on TCNs, against member state 
wishes, through the mechanism of free movement law.  The first example of these openings 
regards TCN family members of EU nationals who exercise their freedom of movement in another member state.  According to the ECJ, TCN family members of EU citizens are entitled to 
the same residence, work and welfare rights as member state nationals.  However, this right, for 
the ECJ, is not directly held by the foreign family member as a “human” right, but is instead 
derived from the rights of EU-national economic migrants, meaning that the ECJ has 
intentionally limited the legal standing of TCNs to economic matters (Guiraudon 1998).  This, 
again, might confirm Garrett et al’s self-limiting hypothesis, despite the fact that it is a small 
opening for TCN spillover.  Another possible expansion of immigrant rights, however, comes 
with the issue of same-sex spouses.  Several officials whom I interviewed mentioned that free 
movement rights could also be extended to TCN same-sex partners of EU citizens, against the 
wishes of many member states, if the ECJ interprets “spouse” to include same-sex partners.  
While covering only a small number of immigrants, this is an example of how supranational 
control can move policy away from national preferences.  One British official admitted to me 
that ECJ competence over immigration and asylum is a “big worry” for the UK, because of the 
tendency of the judiciary to exert its political independence. 
  Another opening, however, has provided additional hope for TCN legal spillover.  The 
TCN rights in this case are also derived from economics, but are potentially farther-reaching than 
that applying to family members.  This opening concerns the status of TCN workers who are 
employed by EU firms performing services in another member state.  In the Rush Portugesa 
[1990] decision, the ECJ found that if some of the company employees are TCNs, “member 
states cannot refuse them entry to protect their own labor market on the grounds that immigration 
from non-EU states is a matter of national sovereignty” (Guiraudon 1998).  In other words, the 
“four freedoms” (labor, capital, goods, services) appear to trump national discretion over 
immigration policy, meaning that TCNs gain rights if they are included in the protective cradle of EU economics (being employed by EU firms).  Again, however, TCNs have no direct rights 
under Rush Portugesa, but instead have indirect rights that stem from discrimination against their 
employers, not against them.  Being that this decision came against member state wishes, 
however, it seems a small step towards legal spillover where TCNs are concerned (Guiraudon 
1998). 
  The third opening that should be mentioned is perhaps the farthest-reaching one in terms 
of the potential for ECJ “activism” to bring TCNs into the EU fold.  This concerns the legal 
status of “Association Agreements” between the EU and third countries, which provided a quasi-
legal framework for supranational immigration policy.  “These Agreements have direct effect 
and have established rights of free movement and the transferability of social entitlements for 
some TCNs,” applying to large numbers of Turkish and North African migrant workers (Geddes 
2000, 149).  Guiraudon (1998) argues that ECJ “activism” allowed for some legal spillover in 
this area, against member state wishes, since “member states clearly intended association law to 
be incomplete in the sense that no individual rights could be inferred” (Hailbronner and 
Katsantonis 1992; 57).  The ECJ was therefore activist, contrary to intense political pressure 
from the member states (and thus contrary to Garrett et al’s self-limiting hypothesis), because it 
ruled that “nationals of associated contracting states had directly enforceable rights that . . . had 
to be upheld by national courts” (Guiraudon, 660).  In the 1987 Demirel case, the ECJ granted 
itself jurisdiction over the entry and residence of Association workers.  In the 1990 Sevince case, 
the ECJ went even further by arguing that a “right of residence” could be inferred from 
Association Agreements, since the already-established rights of employment would be “useless” 
without rights of residence (Guiraudon, 660).  And in the 1991 Kziber case, the Court went further still, by vindicating a Moroccan living in Belgium’s application for unemployment 
benefits, effectively bringing TCNs into the cradle of “social Europe”. 
  These rulings seem to be a victory for supranationalism, because the Court decided to 
ignore the difference between EU nationals and TCNs; “judges applied the principles of 
Community law rather than the limited framework of Association law . . . the Court ignored 
principles such as reciprocity: there are no unemployment benefits in Morocco” (Guiraudon, 
660).  These rulings made the member states “furious,” according to Guiraudon, and even pro-
EU observers found the ECJ’s legal reasoning here to be “dubious” (660).  Was there a loss of 
legitimacy for the Court, and did this cause the Court to retreat, as Garrett’s hypothesis might 
suggest?  The “judicial capital . . . which is involved each time that a court breaks with the past 
and makes a new development” (Weiler 1993) may indeed have eventually seemed “prohibitive” 
for the Court.  In a 1995 case, the ECJ retreated from its earlier activism and ruled against the 
plaintiff, a Turk, whose incapacity to work led to his residence permit not being renewed 
(Guiraudon, 660).  And since then, the member states have been careful to exclude the right of 
free movement from new Association Agreements with Eastern European countries, perhaps 
rendering the Court’s early activism a moot point. 
  However, Geddes (2000) has pointed to the existence of a significant political 
opportunity space here, emphasizing the fact that NGOs have “argued that if these rights are 
extended to some TCNs because of relevant Association Agreements, then it is unsustainable for 
other legally resident TCNs to be excluded” (149).  Indeed, the fairness of this arrangement 
might be called into question by political actors, and this “leads to a free movement dynamic 
with potential spillover effects” (149).  It seems that the Court, while dormant for the moment, 
has preserved itself a future space whereby it could extend Association-derived rights to all TCNs by virtue of the principles of legal coherence and consistency, not to mention normative 
fairness.  Whether or not it acts in this area will be a good future test of the 
intergovernmentalism/supranationalism debate. 
  An additional political opening should be mentioned here, and this is the Treaty provision 
prohibiting discrimination on a wide variety of grounds, including race (but, notably, not 
nationality).  Guild (1998) argues that this anti-discrimination principle (as a guiding norm) “is 
capable of providing a further justification . . . for assimilation of the position of legally resident 
third country nationals to the position of their member state national colleagues” (619).  What 
would be the legal logic?  The Court may in the future rule that treatment of TCNs “may need to 
be equivalent to that of member state nationals if it is to avoid the risk of being challenged as  . . . 
discriminatory on the basis of race” (Guild, 619).  This would admittedly involve a rather large 
leap in legal reasoning by the Court, but the fact that it holds competence over the anti-
discrimination provision means that it might in the future take the activist path, member state 
objections or not.  This is especially true considering that all national courts and tribunals can 
refer questions of non-discrimination to the ECJ (unlike other areas of TCN law, in which only 
courts of final instance can take this step), since the Court has full jurisdiction over this area. 
 
4.  The Commission and the Long-Term Residents Directive 
  As stated above, throughout the past decade the European Commission consistently 
advocated for TCNs to have free movement rights.  But given the intense political salience of the 
issue, several member states were reluctant to take this step.  And because of the institutional 
mechanisms of the Third Pillar (unanimity voting in the Council) it seemed unlikely that the 
objections of these member states could be overcome, in potentially drafting a new directive to let TCNs participate in the single market.  Thus, all pro-immigrant eyes turned to the ECJ as a 
potential force for change.  While this potential has not yet been realized, new hope for 
immigrants and their advocates came from the direction of the Commission in 2003, in the form 
of the so-called “Long Term Residents Directive” (LTRD).  This section will analyze the 
political evolution of the LTRD, with a view to analyzing whether it is an example of successful 
harmonization, and it whether it is (currently or potentially) expansive towards immigrant rights, 
in a way that diverges from national preferences. 
  As stated before, the Commission has been a consistent defender of TCN rights.  And at 
the Tampere Council in 1999, the Commission pushed the member states into declaring their 
agreement with the principle of equality between (legally-resident) TCNs and EU citizens.  This 
is an example of supranational leadership, in which the Commission used its role as agenda-
setter to reach agreement on broad (but not yet binding) policy goals (Ucarer 2001, Hooghe 
2002, Pollack 1999).  The Tampere conclusions read:   
“The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who 
reside legally . . . A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them 
rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.  The legal status of 
third country nationals should be approximated to that of Member States’ 
nationals.  A person, who has resided legally in a Member State . . . should be 
granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible 
to those enjoyed by EU citizens” (European Council 1999). 
 
  Taking these conclusions as its mandate, the Commission then proposed an ambitious 
directive in 2001 that would not only harmonize the status and rights of LTR TCNs across the 
EU, but would also grant these recognized LTRs roughly the same free movement rights as EU 
citizens.  Under the guidelines of the proposed directive, TCNs would be able to freely move 
from their member state of residence to a second member state, as long as they were taking up 
work, study or vocational training (or if they had adequate financial resources to support themselves).  Further, they would not lose their status as a “worker” (and thus not be deportable), 
even if they had an illness, accident, took up vocational training, or lost their job.  In the latter 
case, they would even have a guarantee of unemployment benefits.    On the restrictive side, 
however, the proposed directive did mandate that TCNs would have to apply for a residence 
permit in the second member state within three months of moving there, and could be required to 
present proof of employment or resources, and could also be expelled for reasons of “public 
health”, “public policy”, or “domestic security”.  However, if the second member state expelled 
the TCN, (s)he would have the right to return to the first member state of legal residence. 
  Predictably, this proposal was attacked from two sides.  Some member states felt that it 
was too generous and expansive, while some pro-immigrant groups felt that it was too restrictive 
towards TCN rights, and did not go far enough to equalize their status with EU citizens.  This 
political conflict provides a good test of supranationalism, because the Commission expressed a 
commitment to defending the principle of TCN equality, against the wishes (preferences) of 
some of the more powerful member states.  Thus, I will now evaluate the two-year political 
battle that raged in the Council over the Long-Term Residents Directive, to determine if the 
outcome deviated (or may deviate in the future) from national preferences in any meaningful 
way.  How much did the final Directive, adopted January 2004, diverge from the Commission’s 
proposal (in terms of restricting TCN rights), and do TCNs now have the right of free movement, 
against member state wishes? 
  Pro-immigrant groups had already attacked the proposed 2001 LTRD for being too 
restrictive towards TCNs.  The well known UK-based group Statewatch fretted that the proposed 
LTRD did not explicitly refer to a right to take up economic or non-economic activities under the 
same conditions as EU nationals.  Instead, it created a separate regime with less-clear legal protections.  Statewatch argued for making explicit reference to legislation on free movement 
rights of EU citizens:  “at present, while such a right could possibly be inferred from the 
proposed Directive, it could also be argued that it is not included in the absence of express 
wording.  The best way forward would be to incorporate references to legislation on the free 
movement rights of EC nationals in place of a separate regime for long-term residents” 
(Statewatch 2003).  The UK-based Immigration Law Practitioners' Association raised similar 
objections, in that they recognized the right to reside in a second Member State, but found the 
lack of any express reference to the right to undertake economic or non-economic activities in 
another Member State (ILPA 2003).  The ILPA also raised potential legal problems with 
problemmatic language in the Directive (which could lead to inadequate legal bases for TCN 
rights) in several other areas: unemployment benefits in the second Member State, vocational 
training, identity documents, proof of resources, family reunification, conditions for expulsion, 
judicial remedies, a 3-month deadline for the state to process applications, a provision that 
application fees be no higher than those for nationals to get identity cards, and a provision that 
TCNs cannot work while waiting for their permit in the second Member State, which is not in 
line with the rules for EU citizens.  On all of these issues, the ILPA felt that TCN free movement 
rights either lacked an adequate legal basis (key for future ECJ rulings that might take rights in a 
more expansive direction), or else did not do enough up front to equalize TCN free movement 
rights with those enjoyed by EU nationals. 
  Though the Commission was certainly sympathetic to these positions, it clearly felt that 
its hands were tied to some degree, and that its proposed directive was an acceptable “first draft” 
to begin the (likely) difficult negotiations with the more recalcitrant member states in the 
Council.  Any further expansion of TCN rights might alienate the member states to an insurmountably large degree.  Thus, work began in the Council to turn the Commission’s 
proposal into a real directive that would begin to harmonize TCN status and rights across the EU. 
  It is important to note that the UK, Denmark and Ireland (normally the most Euro-skeptic 
member states on issues of immigration) played virtually no role in the negotiations over the 
LTRD, since these states were opting out of the EU’s immigration policy.  Thus, other member 
states did not have the “usual suspects” to hide behind on this issue (which had worked quite 
well under unanimity voting, for obvious reasons – member states could preserve their Euro-
federalist reputations while letting the UK take the heat for blocking harmonization), and had to 
make their objections clear.  And indeed, a new curmudgeon stepped up to take the UK’s role, in 
the form of Germany.  Over the two years that the Directive was negotiated, Germany 
consistently played the spoiler, preferring to restrict the free movement rights of TCNs.  This 
provides an excellent test of supranationalism, then, because intergovernmentalists would predict 
that Germany would get its way, and that any successful harmonization would reflect German 
preferences.  Supranationalists, on the other hand, would predict that Germany would (or will) 
eventually lose control over the policy. 
  Germany took a very strong line on the issue of TCN free movement.  One German 
official with whom I spoke even denied that the Tampere Conclusions imply equal treatment 
between TCNs and EU nationals.  Referring to the use of the word “approximate”, he (and the 
German delegations to the Council) argued that the Tampere Conclusions do not imply that 
TCNs should have full free movement rights.  Thus, instead of the draft directive proposed by 
the Commission, Germany preferred to let member states give preference to their own nationals 
in the labor market – a clear violation of the principle of free movement of labor.  Germany was 
not alone in this position, however, and was joined by a cabal of like-minded member states.  In a Council working party meeting of December 2002, the Greek, Italian and Austrian delegations 
blatantly opposed the equal treatment of TCNs as regards free movement rights (European 
Council 2002).  At the same meeting, the German delegation joined these three countries in 
advocating that the Directive text be changed so that member states gained the right to give 
preference to their own nationals for jobs.  France, Finland and Sweden opposed this suggestion, 
and advocated full equal treatment for TCNs. 
  As the draft directive was edited and made its way through the Council’s four legislative 
bodies dealing with immigration (the Working Party on Migration and Expulsion, SCIFA, 
COREPER and the JHA Council), two camps coalesced around the issue of free movement 
rights.  The German camp, which also included Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal, resisted granting TCNs full free movement rights.  I do not have the space here to fully 
analyze the reasons behind these national preferences (see Givens and Luedtke 2004 for an 
attempt to explain national preferences), but in the German case it was clear that domestic 
politics was the obvious catalyst.  Germany had previously been quite Euro-federalist and 
cooperative on immigration issues (Hix and Niessen 1996), but (in addition to losing the UK as a 
“shield”) was now recalcitrant because of political pressure on the Social Democratic/Green 
government, coming mainly from the Lander (since the Bundesrat was controlled by the 
Christian Democrats).  One German official admitted to me that Edmund Stoiber, the Chancellor 
of Bavaria and possible future leader of the CDU/CSU, who is quite restrictive on immigration 
(and even wants competence to revert fully back to the member states!), had been making a 
political issue of immigration.  Since the Lander are responsible for paying social benefits and 
aid, there was a prominent worry that legal migration by TCNs might lead to an increase in 
social aid, e.g. a TCN moving to Germany from another EU country and becoming jobless after two years. Since German social protection is more generous that other member states, the Lander 
worried that TCNs would engage in “benefit shopping”, and flock to Germany under the new 
rules.  Since Stoiber and others had succeeded in politicizing this worry, the German Council 
delegations felt that they must protect the principle of favored treatment for nationals vis-à-vis 
TCNs.  We can probably assume that similar dynamics were happening in Austria, Luxembourg, 
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, though Germany’s objections were the most prominent and 
important in terms of the success or failure of the Directive. 
  The pro-TCN camp in the Council included the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Finland 
and Sweden.  These Member States, as well as the Commission, wrangled with Germany and the 
others regarding equal treatment for TCNs.  A Commission official told me that the Commission 
got some leverage by reminding Member States of their grand promises (in the Tampere 
Conclusions), when it came time to draft legislation, thus confirming supranationalist arguments 
about Commission leadership and agenda-setting.  However, the resulting Directive, finally 
adopted in January of 2004, must be seen as a German victory and a setback for pro-TCN 
advocates.  The same Commission official admitted to me that the resulting LTRD does not live 
up to the Tampere Conclusions in many areas. In fact, the final Directive is so restrictive towards 
TCN rights, that a British official told me that the UK is now seriously considering opting in!  
Though there were some victories for the pro-TCN camp in non-free movement areas, such as 
the duration of residence needed before gaining LTR status (Italy wanted it to be six years, but 
the Commission and the more expansive-minded member states succeeded in keeping it to five 
years), on the whole the free movement section of the Directive does not offer much positive 
evidence for supranationalism (in that protectionist national preferences were safeguarded).   Not only did Germany succeed in getting the national labor market preference inserted, 
member states also gained the important rights to set numerical quotas on TCNs, and to require 
that TCNs comply with certain “integration” measures, including taking language classes.  
Importantly for assessing immigration policy harmonization’s impact on European integration in 
general, these and other departures from the principle of equal treatment for TCNs were allowed 
through multiple uses of the word “may” (instead of “shall”) in the language of the directive, so 
that member states are not faced with hard legal obligations.  Recall that a key part of the 
supranationalist argument is the coherence of the law, so that the ECJ can later use legal 
language to raise the standard of rights protection.  With this past history in mind, member states 
obviously here wished to free themselves from further legal action by the ECJ, by agreeing to a 
Directive that contained very weak legal language. 
  Thus, the intergovernmentalist perspective still appears to be the correct one in assessing 
currently developments regarding TCN free movement rights.  However, there are some signs of 
future hope for supranationalism.  One Council legal specialist I spoke with admitted that the 
Court may not be “impressed” with the text of the Directive, and particularly the removal of the 
word “right” (of residence) from the final draft.  He wondered if the ECJ could in the future 
possibly infer a right, using one or more of the legal bases mentioned above.  This same official 
told me that in view of the very minimal and restrictive harmonization contained in the LTRD, 
he sees this directive as an intermediate stage, and thinks that there will be a new one within 10 
years.  Clearly, the ECJ, Commission, and the European Parliament still have some room for 
maneuver in bringing TCNs into the free movement fold, against (some) national preferences.  
This is especially so if the European constitution passes, given that it gives the ECJ full jurisdiction over immigration, gives the Parliament co-decision rights over all aspects of 
immigration, and mandates majority voting in the Council, as opposed to unanimity. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  Why and how have EU organizations attempted to wrest institutional control away from 
member states and move common policies in a more expansive direction vis-à-vis immigrant 
rights?  National governments initially agreed to harmonize immigration policies in order to 
regain control over immigration flows and maximize electoral capital (Guiraudon 2000, Joppke 
1999, Lahav and Guiraudon 2000, Givens and Luedtke 2004).  Thus, the delegation of 
sovereignty was a calculated move to enhance policy effectiveness, in building a “Fortress 
Europe” to more effectively exclude migrants.  But in recent years, this control may now be 
slipping out of the grasp of member states, and this has had (and will likely have in the future) 
positive effects in terms of the level of rights protection and freedoms for immigrants. 
  This policy area provides a strong test of supranationalism’s power, because it appears to 
be a “least likely case” for three reasons: 1) political salience is quite high; 2) the transnational 
“exchangers” (namely immigrants and their employers and supporters) are politically weak and 
face enormous populist counter pressure; and 3) states are openly worried about the dangers of 
supranationalization in the field of immigration, given their past experiences with the EU, and 
have taken active steps to avoid supranationalization.  Though the initial signs are not entirely 
promising, if supranational governance is consolidated even in this controversial, core area of 
sovereignty, then Europe will have made a radical break with traditional notions of statehood and 
territorial control. 
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